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Perhaps a phenomenology + a monadology + a hauntology

Getting acquainted with Salanskis reading of Levinas and thinking of how, in perception, there are always traces of the still others in perceiving the others (language brings in the images of the masters when we look at anything but also every mediation is a trace in perception - think of the notion of importance in Whitehead's Modes of Thought, for instance) I've been elaborating on the account of three modes of existence I gave on Being Up For Grabs. There, each unit (which was a monad) was at the same time a composition, a fragment and a composer. There they relate to the others in a monadology. But this strikes me now as only part of the story. There is a monadology but on top of it and at the same time there is a phenomenology and a hauntology associated to the interiority of each unit. The paradoxico-metaphysics of these units is the (incoherent) juxtaposition of these three arrangements of units in each of their mode of existence. In each mode they enjoy a connection with the others, but a metaphysics of the others includes these three modes and the three arrangements. An ontology of the whole picture that provides a global view of all of them form an inconsistent totality.

Husserl himself felt like he needed a monadology to complement his phenomenology in the fifth meditation. Levinas provides an account of how the freedom of one's spontaneity needs to be hurt by the traces of the others - of how phenomenology should rather be juxtaposed with a hauntology where freedom is (morally) tainted. Further, Levinas himself makes room for a (monadological) dependence on what cannot contest one's freedom but could resist it. He embraces a bifurcation concerning what is my nourishment (nourriture) and what is the other that interrupts and is not something I depend on. Hence, for Levinas, I can go phenomenological concerning what is monadologically associated with me but I also find the absolute other whose hauntology can only command an ethical independent dependency. If we drop the bifurcation, we hint towards the co-existence of two modes of existence: I need nourishment for my chez-moi, but the absolute other can come from anywhere. To be fair, as far as the encounter is concerned, the image of a paradoxico-metaphysics of the others composed by arrangements of modes through a phenomenology plus a monadology plus a hauntology makes perhaps as much violence as the bifurcation. The difference is that it leaves a ground (hauntology) just for the traces of absolute others that are met.

Hence, in Being Up For Grabs I have proposed a monadology of fragments where each subjectivity exists at the same time in three modes. The three modes account for their being up for grabs because they are composed by others, they are fragments in other compositions and because they compose with what is provided by others. The three modes are constitutive of what there is. Now I want to explore these three modes further both as modes of existence of subjectivity and as modes of being up for grabs. It is apparent how these three modes relate to each other: they are incoherent, their blending together lies in paradox. Yet, each unit is at the same time
1) fractured and interrupted by all others – they being up for grabs makes them available like hosts for every other that can interfere in their interior life,
2) dependent on the others – they cannot be maintained or keep their defining relations to other units unless they are helped by all the other units (the monadological meta-stability),
3) sovereign to make use of all others found in the way (la indigne liberté) – their interiority is related to what they find around themselves with their freedom to engage with the others at their will.
It follows three arrangements: a hauntology (1), a monadology (2) and a phenomenology (3).

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